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How Europe's conflict with Russia could develop

How Europe's conflict with Russia could develop

The West must think ahead about its relationship with Russia. Even if the conflicting parties ultimately agree on a ceasefire in Ukraine, this would not end Europe's confrontation with Moscow.

How long will the war last? Ukrainian soldiers in the Sumi region near the Russian border.

Thomas Peter / Reuters

Even after more than two and a half years, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues to dominate the debate about European security. And how could it be otherwise?

Russian President Vladimir Putin crossed a red line in February 2022, openly questioning the European security order. The core principles of this order include the inviolability of borders between sovereign nation states and the prohibition of wars of aggression.

But Russia has gone beyond a war of aggression. It is waging a war of conquest, annexing the territory of another country. The declared aim of the war is to end the existence of the independent Ukrainian nation and the sovereign Ukrainian state.

Russia is thus attacking the foundations on which Europe's security, prosperity and freedom are based. It is an order that was established in Western Europe after the Second World War and adopted by the eastern countries of the continent after the end of the Cold War. The central pillars are NATO and the EU.

The war has radically changed Europe's relations with Russia. The idea of ​​a close partnership with Moscow, which has been a fundamental theme of Western Russia policy since the end of the Cold War, has clearly failed. So far there is no coherent new Russia policy. Today, following Washington's example, Europe has agreed on a dual approach that includes supporting Ukraine and imposing sanctions against Russia.

How will relations with Russia develop in the coming years under such conditions? Four scenarios are conceivable: a direct conflict with Russia, ongoing tensions, a modus vivendi and a regime change in Russia. Below I present four possible scenarios that could play out by 2030 – i.e. in the medium-term future.

1. Open conflict with Russia

This scenario is the least likely. But at the same time it is extremely important for the present – because it describes a possible future that must be prevented by actions today.

Russia is already expanding its military capabilities and is investing heavily in its armed forces. It is receiving support from numerous partners: from China, especially with dual-use goods, from Iran with drones and ballistic missiles, and from North Korea with ammunition and other war-related goods.

In addition, Putin has repeatedly made it clear that he is not only concerned with Ukraine, but also with a dominant position in Eastern and Central Europe.

A frontal attack by Russia is the least likely scenario. On the other hand, an attempt by Moscow to provoke an incident is entirely possible. The Baltic states would be an obvious place for this. Russia could then invade under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians. This would force NATO countries to either respond militarily or, by doing nothing, reveal the emptiness of NATO's promise of collective defense – thus weakening European security. In the long term, this would open up further opportunities for Russia.

Moscow could take this step if it were provoked by weakness in the West, or even just the appearance of such. A lack of unity in the West and a new Russia policy that relies on new concessions to Moscow – for example after a ceasefire in Ukraine – could be interpreted as weakness.

How this scenario might unfold depends on the West's response. Swift, determined resistance could contain the conflict and keep it at the level of an “incident.” Prolonged hesitation, on the other hand, would allow Russia to drive a wedge into the alliance – between the countries of Eastern and Northern Europe that are determined to stop Russian expansion, even at a high price, and those countries that instead hope for a compromise with Russia based on give-and-take in power politics.

2. Persistent tensions

A second scenario for the coming years would be a continuation of tensions at current levels. In this possible future, Russia continues to attack Ukraine, and there are periods of both more intense warfare and calm, possibly in the form of a ceasefire. However, both sides view victory in the war as a possibility. Therefore, neither side is giving up.

At the same time, Russia is stepping up its hybrid war against the West by spreading disinformation and propaganda and occasionally carrying out stealth attacks. It is exerting particularly strong pressure on Georgia and Moldova and continuing the creeping annexation of Belarus.

The West remains reluctant to support Ukraine. While it continues to provide enough aid to prevent the country from giving up and continuing the fight against Russia, it does not provide enough to enable Kyiv to bring about a decisive end to the war in its favor.

3. A new modus vivendi

Another possibility is that the West will ultimately give Ukraine its full support. After a ceasefire, Ukraine will be so sure of the West's military support that a continuation of the war will become hopeless for Russia.

In this scenario, the West builds up the Ukrainian armed forces and supplies what is needed. Now that Ukraine has reliable security guarantees, investors return to the country, refugees return, and Ukraine begins to recover. At the same time, Georgia and Moldova are offered protection from a Russian takeover.

This means that Russia loses the military option in its western neighborhood. Although it can continue to conduct hybrid operations, it is deterred from doing so because the West is strengthening its own armed forces and presenting itself to the countries in the region as a reliable partner.

Relations between Russia and the West remain tense. However, the clear boundaries between what is acceptable and what is not allow the West to make concessions to Russia without compromising its own clear position on security and defense.

4. Regime change in Russia

The fourth scenario is less likely. A successor to Putin would probably continue his course. However, it is unclear whether such a person could quickly exercise similar power or control the country as effectively as Putin. It may be that a successor to Putin lacks the ability to attempt to conquer neighboring countries because the new incumbent would first have to consolidate power at home.

It is even possible that such a change of course would not only bring about a change in leadership, but also a change in the character of the regime and that more liberal positions would prevail again. As after Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, there could be a renewed thaw in Moscow and thus offer opportunities for an opening towards the West.

In such a case, the West would have to make a targeted attempt to make new offers of cooperation and integration to Russia – without ignoring questions of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Russia's neighbors, as was the case after the end of the Cold War. The prerequisite for cooperation must be a clear departure from imperial ambitions.

Influence of the West

The West must be prepared for a range of possible scenarios. What happens in Russia cannot be controlled from the outside. But the West is able to shape the strategic environment in which Russia operates, which in turn has an impact on Russia itself.

The more clearly the West rejects Moscow's attempt to regain a dominant position of power in Eastern and Central Europe through military force and hybrid warfare, the more likely it is that Russia will abandon this project. Because the country has fewer power resources than Europe.

Defence and deterrence must be central elements of a confident European response to the new Russian imperialism. Secure borders make good neighbours. If Europe wants to live in peace with an expansionist Russia, it must show toughness and determination and invest in its own armed forces. As the last few years have shown time and again, this cannot be achieved with diplomacy, friendly words and concessions. Europe must shape the balance of power in its favour.

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