Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk presents opportunities and difficulties

Russian President Vladimir Putin faces grim choices after a Ukrainian offensive that could lead to him bombing his own population, writes Patrick Drennan.

ON AUGUST 7, Ukrainian forces launched an infantry attack 15 kilometers from the Russian border, targeting the Sudzha gas hub, the only access point for Russian gas to the European Union (it also supplies Ukraine).

This diversionary attack has several goals. It is a show of force that exposes the vulnerability of Russia and President Putin. Ukraine can use the captured territory as a bargaining chip in future peace negotiations. It also lures thousands of Russian troops, equipment and aircraft from other key areas so that they can be destroyed by Ukrainian drones and missiles.

How did President Putin react?

He has ordered the region's 180,000 residents to evacuate, offering them 10,000 rubles (about AU$166) each. Some Russian soldiers have already been seen on social media looting their abandoned homes and businesses. As one might imagine, not all residents have heeded this request.

Belarus: A pawn on Putin’s strategic chessboard

The escalating military tensions between Ukraine and Belarus have underlined the complex and precarious security situation in Eastern Europe.

The citizens of Kursk are not hostile towards Ukraine. Ukrainians have lived in this area since World War I and many residents have Ukrainian relatives.

Putin then appointed his old KGB friend Alexander Bortnikov as head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and put him in charge of the operation. Putin's former bodyguard Alexei Dyumin was put in charge on the ground. The counterattack on the Ukrainians is therefore being led by the FSB and not by the Russian military, which actively rejects and distrusts the FSB.

Putin has also moved additional forces to Kursk – more than 20,000 men in total. This includes an elite regiment of paratroopers from Zaporizhia Oblast, but it is mostly a ragtag force of conscripts, engineers and Chechens. The Russians are focused on slowing down the Ukrainians and not stopping them until heavy equipment can arrive by road and rail. Transporting heavy equipment is time-consuming.

Most of these units have dysfunctional communication systems and rely on social media like Telegram to communicate with each other. The arrest of Telegram founder Pavel Durov in Paris has not changed this situation – yet.

While the Russian forces are equal in size to the Ukrainian attacking forces, they may not be large enough to recapture the lost territory once the Ukrainians have dug in. The military maxim, based on operations research, is that an attacking force should outnumber a defending force by three to one. Apparently they were given October 1 as the latest date to achieve this massive goal.

Therefore, the future prospects are more on Ukraine’s side.

On the other hand, Putin, who gives the Russian public the impression that the situation is calm, has to make difficult decisions.

Ukrainians continue to live in fear of death

While the Israeli military wreaks death and destruction in the Gaza Strip, Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine is entering its third year with the attention of the international community having waned significantly.

Ukraine has entrenched itself around the Kursk towns of Tyotkino, Sudzha (a nearby major gas hub) and Korenevo (a busy railway station). All of these towns are home to about 5,000 Russian citizens.

Putin now faces the unfortunate choice of bombing these cities, destroying their infrastructure and killing Russian citizens. He has hesitated so far, but ultimately he may have no choice.

Russia uses a variety of missiles to attack Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure, including Kh-55 cruise missiles, Iskander-1000 ballistic missiles and unpredictable North Korean KN-23 missiles. As powerful as these weapons are, they are not particularly accurate and could lead to friendly fire scenarios in Kursk.

Putin could again threaten to use tactical nuclear weapons or even persuade his reluctant ally in Belarus to intervene.

The less palatable but more likely decision would be to increase conscription again, as he did in March, adding another 150,000 conscripts to his army. Putin could justify this by calling the August invasion a direct NATO attack on Russia. But conscription will not be well received in his power centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg, which have so far been relatively insulated from the horrors of this relentless war. It could lead to his downfall.

Some military analysts in the West are urging NATO, particularly the United States, to give Ukraine permission to advance deep into Russia with powerful NATO weapons – which are currently prohibited. They must be careful. No one will benefit from Putin's violent overthrow, leading to a major civil war in Russia. Many of the 21 republics that make up the Russian Federation have nuclear weapons.

Patrick Drennan is a New Zealand-based journalist with degrees in American history and economics.

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